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Using the generalized Bell states and controlled not gates, we introduce an enatanglement-based
quantum key distribution (QKD) of d-level states (qudits). In case of eavesdropping, Eve’s infor-
mation gain is zero and a quantum error rate of d−1
d
is introduced in Bob’s received qudits, so that
for large d, comparison of only a tiny fraction of received qudits with the sent ones can detect the
presence of Eve.
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I. INTRODUCTION
As far as classical computation and classical commu-
nication are concerned, binary units of memory and bi-
nary logic gates play an inevitable and natural role due
to the inherent simplicity of Boolean algebra on the one
hand and their compatibility with on and off states of
electronic switches on the other hand. With such clas-
sical gates as NOT, AND, and OR, the simplest logical
operations with which we are familiar in everyday life,
and also any binary function can be implemented. They
are also quite simple to design electronically. However
in quantum computation and communication (see [1, 2]
and references therein), the main resources that have the
potential of surpassing our conventional classical meth-
ods, are quantum parallelism (for massive computation),
non-locality and entanglement (for communication) and
uncertainty relations (e.g. for Quantum Key Distribution
among other things). For utilizing these resources, two
level quantum states are by no means inevitable. Only
considerations of quantum hardware should decide be-
tween using 2-level or multi level states. At present a ma-
jor difficulty in quantum computation is the limit on the
number of qubits that can be coupled experimentally [3].
Although it may be easier to construct universal gates for
qubits than for qudits, the use of d-dimensional systems
or qudits has the advantage that compared to qubits,
fewer systems should be coupled to obtain a given dimen-
sionality of the Hilbert space. Apart from practical con-
siderations, it will enhance and deepen our understanding
of the subject if we try to re-formulate quantum computa-
tion and communications in a dimension-free context. In
view of this, various authors have tried to generalize some
of the algorithms, protocols, or error correcting codes of
two level quantum computation to arbitrary dimensional
Hilbert spaces [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13]. Conse-
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quently one sees in the literature that the same basic tool
(i.e. a generalized gate) has been defined independently
in several works.
For example the generalization of one of the basic gates
of quantum computation, thats the controlled not gate
appears to have been given independently by a number
of authors under different names [4, 5, 6, 8, 14, 15]. The
same is also true for the generalized Hadamard gate. Spe-
cially in [5] an experimental realization of the generalized
XOR gate to d-levels has been proposed, where the num-
ber n of photons in an electromagnetic mode signifies the
state |n〉, n = 0, . . . , d − 1 and a Kerr interaction be-
tween these photons and their fourier transform is used
to induce the generalized XOR gate on the states.
In this paper we are concerned with a protocol of
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) and its generalization
to states of arbitrary dimension. Quantum Cryptography
(QC) which is based on very simple ideas and yet not far
from real applications as the other highlights of quantum
computations are (like factoring large integers) is one of
the most promising areas of research in Quantum Com-
putation and Information.
Particularly interesting is that in QC one tries to
turn the apparently negative or counter-intuitive rules of
quantum mechanics, which has resulted in epistemolog-
ical debates in the past decades, into absolutely useful
devices for engineering applications. One such concept
has been the uncertainty principle, or the fact that ob-
servation or measurement perturbs the observable. This
rule has been utilized in a most beautiful application in
the form of BB84 protocol for QKD [16], where bits of
a Key prepared by two legitimate parties, in the form of
spin or polarization of particles in random bases, are in-
evitably perturbed by a non-legitimate third party. (For
a review on QC including many theoretical and practical
issues, see [17].)
Another nonclassical and counter-intuitive concept,
has been the concept of non-locality and entanglement
which has found even wider applications, to the extent
that nowadays a major problem about non-locality is not
how to interpret it, but how to measure it like other use-
ful resources as energy and momentum.
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2The first entanglement-based protocol of QKD has
been the work of Eckert [18], which later was shown to
be equivalent to the original BB84 protocol [19],( see [17]
for finer details). Two other QKD protocols which have
used entanglement in an essential way has been reported
in [20] and [21]. The first of these uses entanglement
swapping via Bell measurements to securely transfer a
key and has been generalized to d-level systems in [15].
The second is based on local gate operations on a reusable
EPR pair, where Alice tries to hide the secure data by
entangling each bit with the EPR pair, sending the bit to
Bob who can disentangle the bit and read the data. The
strategy of Eve is to somehow entangle herself with the
whole state of the EPR and the bit by suitable opera-
tions and find access to the data, without being revealed
by Alice and Bob.
The aim of this paper is to generalize this second pro-
tocol to higher dimensional states and at the same time
give a clear exposition of its basics.
For the sake of brevity, we will not go into the details
of 2-level protocol. For this, the reader can either consult
reference [21], or else go through the next sections and
at each step set d = 2.
The basic advantage of this protocol is that as we will
show, not only Eve’s presence will be detected by Alice
and Bob, but also her information gain is zero, compared
to the 50 percent information gain in the BB84 protocol.
This is true in every dimension, but as we will show Eves
presence introduces a higher Quantum Bit Error Rate,
in higher dimensional states, so that her presence can be
detected more easily.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In section
2 we first review some known and new facts about the
generalized Bell states, and the generalizations of CNOT
and the Hadamard gates to qudits. In section 3 which has
been divided into several subsections, we generalize the
QKD scheme of [21] to d-level systems, and discuss the
security of the protocol against some individual attacks.
We show that the information gain of Eve is actually zero
and show how the intervention of Eve introduces an error
rate of d−1
d
into the data received by Bob, and greatly
enhances the chance of her detections by the legitimate
parties. In all this we are concerned only with theoreti-
cal considerations and do not consider practical issues, or
any rigor in proving security, all these are important but
should be considered in separate works. Finally in sec-
tion 4 which concludes the paper, we discuss a possible
route for generalization of our results to the continuous
variables. Some of the calculations which are not detailed
in the main text, are collected in the appendix.
II. STATES, AND GATES FOR d-LEVEL
SYSTEMS
For qudits, a generalization of the familiar Bell states,
has been introduced in [5, 22, 23, 24]. These are a set of
d2 maximally entangled states which form an orthonor-
mal basis for the space of two qudits. Their explicit forms
are:
|Ψm,n〉 := 1√
d
d−1∑
j=0
ζnj |j, j +m〉 (1)
where ζ = e
2pii
d and m and n run from 0 to d− 1. These
states have the properties 〈Ψm,n|Ψm′,n′〉 = δn,n′δm,m′
(orthonormality) and trace2(|Ψm,n〉〈Ψm,n|) = 1d1 (max-
imal entanglement). The following operators [4, 22, 23,
24] are also useful, since they play the analogous role of
Pauli operators for qudits:
Um,n =
d−1∑
j=0
ζnj |j +m〉〈j| (2)
For example, given the entangled state |Ψ0,0〉, only one of
the parties, say Alice, can generate any Bell state |Ψm,n〉
by acting on |Ψ0,0〉 with Um,n, i.e:
(1 ⊗ Um,n)|Ψ0,0〉 = |Ψm,n〉 (3)
One should however note that contrary to the Pauli oper-
ators, the operators Um,n are not necessarily Hermitian.
One can also generalize the Hadamard gate which
turns out to be quite useful in manipulating qudits for
various applications [4, 5, 14].
H :=
1√
d
d−1∑
i,j=0
ζij |i〉〈j| (4)
where ζ = e
2pii
d . This operator is really not new and it is
known as the quantum Fourier transform when d = 2n.
In that case it acts on n qubits. Here we are assuming
it to be a basic gate on one single qudit, in the same
way that the ordinary Hadamard gate is a basic gate
on one qubit. This operator is symmetric and unitary
(HH∗ = 1 ), but not hermitian.
To generalize the NOT and the CNOT gates, we note
that in the context of qudits, the NOT gate, is basically
a mod-2 adder. For qudits this operator gives way to a
mod-d adder, or a Right-Shift gate,[4, 5, 8, 14, 15]
R|j〉 = |j + 1〉mod d (5)
R−1|j〉 ≡ L|j〉 = |j − 1〉mod d, (6)
where L has been used to denote a left shift. Note that
Rd = 1 , compared to NOT 2 = 1 .
For every unitary operator U the controlled gate Uc
which acts on the second qudit conditioned on the first
qudit is naturally defined as follows:
Uc(|i〉 ⊗ |j〉) = |i〉 ⊗ U i|j〉 (7)
Note the difference with the qubit case. In the qubit case
a controlled operator acts only if the value of the first bit
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FIG. 1: Circuit identity for d-level gates
is 1, here it acts i times if the value of the first qudit is i.
(Sometimes it is said that a controlled operator is like an
if statement in classical computation [1]. If we take this
statement literally, then a controlled operation for d-level
states acts like a loop.) In particular the controlled shift
gates which play the role of CNOT gate, act as follows:
Rc|i, j〉 = |i, j + i〉 Lc|i, j〉 = |i, j − i〉 (8)
Every function f from {0, 1, . . . , d−1}n → {0, 1, . . . , d−
1}m is made reversible by the definition fr(x,y) =
(x, f(x) + y) where all additions are performed mod
d. In quantum circuits such a function is implemented
by a unitary operator Uf |x,y〉 := |x, f(x) + y〉 where
x ∈ {0, 1, . . . , d − 1}n and y ∈ {0, 1, . . . , d − 1}m. Note
that here and in all that follows addition of multi dits is
performed dit-wise and mod d.
Quite analogously to the q-bits, the Hadamard and the
Controlled Shift gates can generate all the Bell states
{|Ψm,n〉} from the computational basis states {|m,n〉}
[5]:
Rc(H ⊗ 1 )|n,m〉 = |Ψm,n〉 (9)
Many other properties of these gates are simply car-
ried over from the case of q-bits to the general case with
appropriate modifications. For example one can check
the validity of the circuit identity in fig. (1).
III. AN ENTANGLEMENT-BASED PROTOCOL
OF QKD FOR d-LEVEL STATES
In this section we generalize an entanglement-based
protocol of quantum Key Distribution first put forward
in [21] to d-level states and perform further analysis of
the method.
A. QKD in the absence of Eve
The starting point of this protocol is the sharing of a
Bell state |Ψ00〉 = 1√
d
∑d−1
j=0 |j, j〉a,b by Alice and Bob.
The qudit to be sent is denoted by q, which is encoded
as a basis state |q〉k. Throughout the paper we use the
subscripts a, b, k and e for Alice, Bob, key and Eve re-
spectively. The basic idea, neglecting considerations of
Eve’s attack for now, is that Alice performs a controlled-
right shift on |q〉k and thus entangles this qudit to the
the previously shared Bell state, producing the state
|Φ〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
j=0
|j, j, q + j〉a,b,k. (10)
She then sends the qudit to Bob. By this operation she
is hiding the qudit q in a completely mixed state, since
ρk := tra,b|Φ〉|〈Φ| = 1d1 k. At the destination, Bob per-
forms a controlled-left shift on the qudit and disentangles
it from the Bell state, hence revealing the value of q with
certainty.
Note that in contrast with the BB84 protocol, here the
key is not determined a posteriori and randomly, hence
a larger transfer rate is possible.
B. An individual attack by Eve
A possible conceivable attack by Eve(e) is that she
entangles her state to those of Alice, Bob and the inter-
cepted key so that after Bob’s measurement of the qudit,
she can obtain partial information about the qudit. The
best way to describe and visualize the protocol is to refer
to fig. (2), where the qudits are drawn as lines and states
at each stage are shown explicitly.
The strategy that Eve follows should be described sep-
arately for the first qudit and the rest of the qudits. For
the first qudit, she performs no measurement and pro-
ceeds so that her qudit gets entangled with the Bell state
of Alice and Bob at the end of the process. For this she
uses a controlled right-shift on her qudit conditioned on
the value of the first qudit being sent (see fig. (2)). The
states at various stages are as follows, where in each ket
the qudits refer respectively from left to right to Alice(a),
Bob(b), the key(k) and Eve(e):
|Φ0〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
j=0
|j, j, q1, 0〉a,b,k,e (11)
|Φ1〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
j=0
|j, j, q1 + j, 0〉a,b,k,e (12)
|Φ2〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
j=0
|j, j, q1 + j, q1 + j〉a,b,k,e (13)
Note that choice of |0〉 for Eve’s original state is quite
arbitrary. Her strategy works with any other choice. In
the last stage when Bob performs his Left-Shift gate, he
produces the state
|Φ3〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
j=0
|j, j, q1, q1 + j〉a,b,k,e (14)
and thus disentangles the key and measures correctly the
value of its first dit q1. However his shared Bell state
with Alice has now been left entangled with the state of
4the entanglement with Eve) for the next round (i.e; for
sending the dit q2 of the key). Thus for the next round
the state that Alice and Bob will start with is:
|Ψ0〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
j=0
|j, j, q2, q1 + j〉a,b,k,e (15)
Note that we are assuming that Alice and Bob do not
have access to a reservoir of Bell states, the later be-
ing supposedly expensive. Thus they are using one Bell
state for sending the whole key or at least a considerable
fraction of it.
It is important to note that Eve modifies her strategy
for the next dits, by first performing a left-shift, measur-
ing her qudit and then performing a right-shift on her
qudit. The rest of the process is like that for the first
qudit (see fig. (3)). The various states in different stages
shown in the figure are as follows:
|Ψ0〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
j=0
|j, j, q2, j + q1〉a,b,k,e (16)
|Ψ1〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
j=0
|j, j, q2 + j, j + q1〉a,b,k,e (17)
|Ψ2〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
j=0
|j, j, q2 + j, q1 − q2〉a,b,k,e (18)
At this stage Eve who has disentangled her qudit from
the rest of the state measures her own qudit to be q1−q2.
She then performs the controlled right shift on her qu-
dit to restore the original state |Ψ1〉. At the destination
Bob again proceeds as before, performs his left shift and
measures the value of q2, leaving the state of Alice, Eve
and his own state, in an entangled state ready for use in
the next round.
In this way Eve intercepts the qudits
q1 − q2, q1 − q3, q1 − q4, . . .
from which she can infer all the sequence by checking d
possible values for q1.
Note that for each qudit, Eve is effectively doing an
intercept-recent strategy, however she does not intercept
the value of the qudit (say q2) sent by Alice, but she
measures a value q2−q1, where q1 is the value of the first
sent qudit which has been intercepted in an earlier stage.
C. Protection against Eve’s intervention
To protect this protocol against this kind of attack,
Alice and Bob proceed as follows: Before sending each of
the qudits, Alice and Bob act on their shared Bell state
by the Hadamard gates H and H∗, respectively. The key
point is that a Bell state |ψ0,0〉 disentangled from the
outside world is unchanged under this operation, while a
state entangled with outside is not:
(H ⊗H∗)|Ψ0,0〉 = |Ψ0,0〉. (19)
In the absence of intervention of Eve, this extra operation
has no effect on the protocol.
In fact the shared Bell state is unchanged under more
general operators of the form U ⊗ U∗, where U is any
unitary operator. We will investigate this possibility in
appendix B.
It is clear from fig. (2), that for the first qudit nothing
changes. However for the second qudit and other qudits,
essential changes occur in the intermediate states in the
process. As we will see, in this way Alice and Bob can
prevent Eve from getting any useful information. The
entangled state of Alice, Bob and Eve remained from the
first round is
|χ〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
j=0
|j, j, j + q1〉a,b,e (20)
When Alice and Bob perform their Hadamard gates on
their qudits, this state changes to
|χ˜〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
i,j,k=0
Hi,jH
∗
k,j |i, k, j + q1〉a,b,e (21)
Thus the second round of the protocol after Alice inserts
the second dit of the key, starts with the state
|Ψ̂0〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
i,j,k=0
Hi,jH
∗
k,j |i, k, q2, j + q1〉a,b,k,e
(22)
The state |Ψ̂1〉 which results after Alice’s controlled R
operation will be:
|Ψ̂1〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
i,j,k=0
Hi,jH
∗
k,j |i, k, i+ q2, j + q1〉a,b,k,e
(23)
The qudit is now sent to Bob. We will show in appendix
A, that this new state has no information for Eve. In
fact we will show that, the density matrix of her system
and the qudit will be
ρk,e =
1
d2
1 k ⊗ 1 e (24)
Therefore under any unitary operation on her qudit and
the sent qudit whether it be the controlled L gate used
for the first round or a more complex cleverly chosen
operator, she will not be able to get useful information
from the intercepted data. More generally it is hardly
possible for Eve that by a quantum operation derived
from suitable interactions with her ancillas, can derive
any useful information from this density matrix.
D. The information gain of Eve
The above situation is analogous to the case of BB84
protocol, where with respect to any basis chosen by Eve,
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the density matrix of the qubits intercepted by Eve are
identity matrices. However there is one major difference
in that in the BB84 protocol and its variations and gener-
alizations to higher dimensional states, the protocol ends
up with a public announcement of the bases of Alice and
Bob, from which Eve finds that she has intercepted a
fraction of the qubits or qudits correctly. Therefore Eve
finds partial information about the key and only her re-
vealing by Alice and Bob saves those protocols. Here we
will show that the information gain of Eve is actually
zero and she obtains no information at all about the key.
The mean information gain per bit of Eve I, is the differ-
ence between two relative entropies and is interpreted as
the percentage of bits which are saved when Eve wants
to write the data of Alice from her own intercepted data
[17]. We have:
I = Ha priori −Ha posterieri (25)
Assuming that Alice sends the qudits uniformly, we have:
Hapriori = log2 d. We also have:
Ha posterieri = −
∑
r
p(r)p(i|r) log2 p(i|r) (26)
where p(r) is the probability that Eve receives a dit value
of r and p(i|r) is the a posterieri probability that Alice
has sent a dit value of i given that Eve has received a
dit value of r. The later can be easily calculated from
Bayes’s formula
p(i|r) = p(i)p(r|i)∑
p(i)p(r|i) (27)
Since Alice is assumed to send the dits uniformly, we
have p(i) = 1
d
and since the density matrix of Eve is
unity, p(r|i) = 1
d
, thus we find: p(i|r) = 1
d
. Inserting all
this in (26) we find that Ha posterieri = log2 d = Ha priori
and hence zero information gain for Eve. This is a very
interesting property of this protocol compared with the
BB84 protocol and its variations or generalizations to
higher dimensional systems where the information gain
of the Eve is non-zero. In fact in the BB84 protocol
the 50 percent information gain is due to those occasions
where the basis of Eve happens to be the same as the
publicly announced bases of Alice and Bob. Here there
is no public announcement of any kind and so all the dits
that Eve measures are really worthless at the end of the
protocol.
E. Detection of Eve
At this stage we want to show how Alice and Bob can
infer the presence of Eve from comparison of their data.
Although by no unitary operation on her system and the
key, she can gain information from the key, she may want
to use a clever operation to reduce as much as possible
the Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER) introduced into
the data received by Bob, and hence her chance of being
detected. The QBER depends on her choice of the op-
eration. Suppose that she performs the same sequence
of (Controlled R + measurement + controlled L ) oper-
ations that she was doing in her successful attacks. It
is straightforward to see that with the preservation of
6Hadamard gates, the new state that reaches Bob, pro-
vided that the qudits q1 and q2 have been sent and Eve
has measured a qudit value of q in the second round is:
|Φ3〉 =
d−1∑
i,k=0
Hi,i+q2−q1+qH
∗
k,i+q2−q1+q
|i, k, i+ q2, q〉a,b,k,e (28)
After Bob performs his controlled-L operation, the final
state ready for measurement will be:
|Φ4〉 =
d−1∑
i,k=0
Hi,i+q2−q1+qH
∗
k,i+q2−q1+q
|i, k, i+ q2 − k, i+ q + q2〉 (29)
It is again a simple computation to find the density
matrix corresponding to the Key space from this state,
which turns out to be
ρk := tra,b,e|Φ4〉〈Φ4| = 1
d
1 k. (30)
This means that Bob measures all the values of the key
qudit with equal probability and his chance of getting
the correct qudit is 1
d
. Hence the QBER introduced into
the data by Eve’s intervention is d−1
d
.
IV. DISCUSSIONS
We have studied a protocol of quantum key distribu-
tion for d-level systems based on shared entanglement of
a reusable Bell state and have shown that in this protocol,
the information gain of Eve is zero and the Quantum Bit
Error Rate (QBER) introduced by her interception into
the data received by Bob is d−1
d
. The situation is simi-
lar to the generalizations of the BB84 protocol to higher
dimensional states [11, 12, 13] in which the larger the
number of states, the larger is the QBER, which in turn
may be larger than any noise already present in the chan-
nel. This later fact seems to be an advantage in terms of
the security of the key distribution scheme [25]. These
results are based only on the analysis of a direct individ-
ual attack by Eve. It may be interesting to study further
types of attacks and to establish theoretical bounds to
the information gain and the QBER in this protocol or
go through a general analysis along the lines that have
been followed for the BB84 protocol in [25, 26, 27] and to
see if this protocol has an unconditional security or not.
Another route for extending our results is to consider
the continuous variables. There has been a lot of interest
toward quantum computation and quantum communica-
tion with continuous variables in the past couple of years
(see [28, 29] and references therein), where instead of bits,
information may be stored in infinite dimensional states
like position or momentum of a particle or amplitude
of an electromagnetic field. Part of this interest derives
from the fact that it has been shown that a combination
of optical devices like phase shifters and beam splitters
may be sufficient to act as a set of universal gates. There-
fore many algorithms and protocols have been re-studied
for continuous variables [29]. Now that we have a QKD
protocol for d-level states for any d, a natural question
arises whether it is possible to go to a proper continuous
limit and define the above process for continuous vari-
ables. We can simply replace the discrete states |j〉 with
continuous variables |x〉,−∞ < x < ∞ and ζ = e 2piid
with ζ = e2pii in all the formulas for states and operators
to adapt the protocol to the continuous variables. In all
stages we need also change summations to integrations:
1√
d
d−1∑
0
→ 1√
2pi
∫ +∞
−∞
dx (31)
Following these we will find the generalized Bell states in
the continuous case:
|Ψα,β〉 = 1√
2pi
∫
eiβx|x, x+ α〉dx (32)
where α and β are continuous labels ranging from −∞ to
+∞ and |x〉 is a continuous state like position and all the
integrals now and hereafter are over the real line. These
states are normalized in the sense that
〈Ψα,β |Ψα′,β′〉 = δ(α− α′)δ(β − β′) (33)
and are maximally entangled in the sense that
trace2(|Ψα,β〉〈Ψα,β |) = 1
2pi
∫ +∞
−∞
|x〉〈x|dx.
The generalization of the Hadamard operator is nothing
but the Fourier transform operator which has already
been used in [29] to generalize the Grover algorithm [30]
to continuous domain.
H |x〉 = 1√
2pi
∫
eixy|y〉dy (34)
The controlled right shift operator now takes the form
Rc|x, y〉 = |x, x + y〉 (35)
which as an operator takes the particularly simple form
Rc = e
−iX⊗P (36)
This operator has also appeared already in [5]. To define
the form of the protocol for the continuous variables, it
is enough to modify all the states in various stages of
the protocol as stated above. It may then be practically
more feasible to really implement this protocol by optical
means.
APPENDIX A
In this appendix we show that Eve can not counteract
the action of the Hadamard gates by replacing her con-
trolled shift gate by any other unitary operator or even
7by any quantum operation. Therefore any measurement
of her system or the intercepted qudit will reveal nothing
to her.
When Eve intercepts the sent qudit, she will have ac-
cess to the last two parts of the following state:
|Ψ2〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
i,j,k=0
Hi,jH
∗
k,j |i, k, i+ q2, j + q1〉a,b,k,e
(A1)
One can now find the density matrix of Eve and the
sent qudit from ρk,e = tra,b(|Ψ2〉〈Ψ2|). Using the primed
dummy indices like i′, j′... for the bra state 〈Ψ2| we have:
ρk,e =
1
d
∑
HijH
∗
kjH
∗
i′j′Hk′j′δii′δkk′
|i+ q2, j + q1〉〈i′ + q2, j′ + q1| (A2)
Summing over i′, k′ we find:
ρk,e =
1
d
∑
HijH
∗
kjH
∗
ij′Hkj′
|i+ q2, j + q1〉〈i + q2, j′ + q1| (A3)
Summing over k and using the symmetry and unitarity
of H (
∑
H∗kjHkj′ = δjj′ ) and then summing over j
′ we
obtain:
ρk,e =
1
d
∑
HijH
∗
ij |i+ q2, j + q1〉〈i + q2, j + q1|
(A4)
Now we use the definition of Hij :=
1√
d
ζij , to set
HijH
∗
ij =
1
d
. The last step is done by a relabelling of
the indices i+ q2 and j + q1 to end with
ρk,e =
1
d2
∑
l,m
|l,m〉〈l,m| = 1
d2
1 k ⊗ 1 e (A5)
APPENDIX B
In this appendix we investigate the consequences of
replacing the Hadamard gates with an arbitrary unitary
gate U . As stated in the text, the Bell state |Ψ0,0〉 is
invariant under the action of U ⊗ U∗ for any unitary
operator. Suppose that Alice or Bob use an operator
U instead of H , either deliberately or else by unwanted
errors in their gates. To find the information gain of Eve,
we need to calculate as in appendix A, the density matrix
ρk,e = tra,b(|Ξ2〉〈Ξ2|), where |Ξ2〉 is
|Ξ2〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
i,j,k=0
Ui,jU
∗
k,j |i, k, i+ q2, j + q1〉a,b,q,e
(B1)
The calculations are similar to appendix A, and the final
result is:
ρk,e =
1
d
d−1∑
i,j=0
|Ui,j |2|i+ q2, j + q1〉k,e〈i+ q2, j + q1|
(B2)
Thus if the operator U shares only the property with
the Hadamard gate that |Ui,j |2 = 1d , then again we will
have ρk,e =
1
d2
1 k ⊗ 1 e and the information gain of Eve
reduces to zero. In this sense the protocol is somehow
robust against a large number of errors in the Hadamard
gates.
Secondly we can repeat the calculation that lead to the
final density matrix of the key dits in the hands of Bob,
eq. (30), to determine the new QBER. This time we have
|Ξ4〉 =
d−1∑
i,k=0
Ui,i+q2−q1+qU
∗
k,i+q2−q1+q
|i, k, i+ q2 − k, i+ q + q2〉 (B3)
It is again a simple computation to find the density ma-
trix corresponding to the Key space from this state:
ρk := tra,b,e|Ξ4〉〈Ξ4|
=
1
d
∑
i,k
|Ui,i+q2−q1+q|2|Uk,i+q2−q1+q|2
|i+ q2 − k〉k〈i+ q2 − k| (B4)
Again if for |Ui,j |2 = 1d , we will obtain a completely mixed
matrix 1
d
1 k, and the same QBER as with the Hadamard
gates.
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